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CASE COMMENTS
a failure to provide protection of property under Virginia law, the court
concluded that Goldstar's claim failed under the FTCA.
Goldstar also argued that the United States had voluntarily acted to
provide police protection, creating a duty to exercise due care in the
performance of such act. Goldstar contended that a voluntarily assumed
duty is actionable under the FTCA. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment because a voluntary act of the government falls within the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA. The court applied the United States
Supreme Court rule that the discretionary exception applies when the
relevant conduct involves an element of governmental choice in addition to
public policy considerations. The court quickly determined that the military
operation in Panama was a matter of public policy, and then considered
whether the government's decision regarding proper police protection in-
volved an element of choice. The court determined that no international
directive mandated the United States' decision, and no expressly articulated
standard limited the Government's discretion. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the decision to provide protection was purely discretionary, and
within the FTCA's exceptions. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Goldstar opinion is significant because it determined that the Hague
Convention is not self-executing. While other circuits have held the Geneva
Convention is not self-executing and therefore not a waiver of sovereign
immunity, 661 Goldstar is the first time a circuit explicitly reached this
conclusion about the Hague Convention.662 Unless the Government specifi-
cally creates a new cause of action for which it waives immunity, federal
courts will not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
T. TRADE REGULATION
Anheuser-Busch v. L & L Wings
962 F.2d 316 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992)
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc.,66 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed trademark infringement
issues involving the parody defense. Section 1114(1)(a) of the Lanham Trade-
Mark Act (Lanham Act)"1 protects a registered trademark holder from
661. See Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 334 (llth Cir. 1992) (holding that Geneva
Convention did not create privately enforceable rights and, therefore, was not self-executing);
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that Geneva
Convention was not self-executing).
662. But see Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2nd Cir. 1976) (concluding that Hague
Convention did not confer any private rights with regard to expropriation of property). One
possible implication of the Second Circuit's Dreyfus opinion is that the Hague Convention is not
self-executing, but the court did not directly address the question.
663. 962 F.2d 316 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992).
664. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (1988).
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another's use of a trademark that is likely to cause consumer confusion. 6 5
For example, an unauthorized use of a trademark that confuses an ordinary
customer as to the source or sponsorship of the good constitutes a violation
of the Lanham Act.
The Fourth Circuit has held that determination of the likelihood of
consumer confusion is an issue of fact. 6 7 The burden is on the plaintiff to
convince the trier of fact that the defendant's use of the trademark is, more
likely than not, to cause consumer confusion. In Pizzeria Uno Corp. v.
Temple,65 the Fourth Circuit identified seven factors relevant to a trademark
infringement determination: the strength of the plaintiff's mark, the degree
of similarity between the two marks; the similarity of the goods they identify;
the similarity of the facilities used in the businesses; the similarity of the
advertising; the defendant's intent; and, the presence of actual confusion. 6 9
This is not an exhaustive list of factors and no one factor is dispositive. 670
In Anheuser-Busch, Anheuser-Busch brought suit against Venture Mar-
keting, Inc. and L & L Wings, Inc., in the United States District Court for
South Carolina for manufacturing and selling T-shirts that allegedly in-
fringed on Anheuser-Busch's trademark for Budweiser beer. Anheuser-Busch
argued that the defendants' T-shirt design was confusingly similar to the
Budweiser beer label and likely to mislead consumers into believing that
Anheuser-Busch sold or sponsored the T-shirt. The T-shirt design, the
purpose of which was to advertise Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, consisted
of a beer can with a red, white and blue label reading "Myrtle Beach" and
"King of Beaches." A slogan underneath the beer can read "This Beach is
for You."
The defendants argued that their T-shirt design did not constitute a
violation of the Lanham Act because it was parody. Parody is a form of
artistic expression that intentionally mimics or copies an original work in
an effort to amuse the public.671 The founder of Venture Marketing testified
that he designed the T-shirt to parody the Budweiser beer label. In so doing,
he intentionally imitated the nonverbal portion of the Budweiser label and
mimicked the verbal phrases on the Budweiser label.
665. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 206 (1992) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) for proposition that Lanham Act protects
registered trademark holder from another's use of trademark that is likely to cause consumer
confusion).
666. Id. at 318 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., 903 F.2d 277, 293
(3rd Cir. 1991)).
667. Id. at 325 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Fourth Circuit considers the likelihood of
confusion to be a factual determination amenable to jury resolution unlike the Second and Sixth
Circuits that treat it as a legal determination. Id.
668. 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984).
669. Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984).
670. Anheuser-Busch, 962 F.2d at 319.
671. See Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hoggs Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir.
1987) (holding that intent to parody existing trademark does not support inference of likelihood
of confusion as intent to parody is not intent to confuse public).
CASE COMMENTS
At trial, the jury rendered a verdict for the defendants finding that the
T-shirt design did not create a likelihood of consumer confusion. The
district court, however, granted Anheuser-Busch's motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, holding that the only reasonable conclusion
which the evidence permitted was that the unauthorized use of the trademark
created a likelihood of confusion. The defendants appealed.
On appeal, Anheuser-Busch argued that the similarity of format alone
constituted a trademark infringement. In rejecting this argument, the Fourth
Circuit declared that the Lanham Act's test for trademark infringement
does not focus on how closely the registered trademark is duplicated, but
rather on whether the use by the alleged infringer is likely to create consumer
confusion. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that the Lanham Act provides
protection only from uses that create a likelihood of consumer confusion.
The Fourth Circuit determined that the jury examined the T-shirt as a whole
and reasonably concluded that consumer confusion was unlikely.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's verdict, holding that the
trial judge improperly substituted his judgment on the issue of the likelihood
of consumer confusion for that of the jury's. Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict for
the defendants.
In overturning the jury verdict, the district court placed dispositive
weight on the Pizzeria Uno factors that weighed in Anheuser-Busch's favor.
These factors were the unquestionable strength of plaintiff's trademarks,
the identical goods the marks identified, and the parties' similar facilities
and advertising. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court misconstrued
the nature of the Pizzeria Uno factors. According to the Fourth Circuit,
the factors are to serve only as a guide, not as a rigid formula. The Fourth
Circuit further noted that the factors are not of equal importance and that
no single factor is always relevant in any given case.
The Fourth Circuit suggested that the district court would have seen
the awkwardness in applying the factor analysis if the district court had
properly addressed the parody issue. The keystone to parody is imitation.
Factors such as the strength of the trademark and the similarities of the
marks are not dispositive in the context of parody because parody entails
evoking the original work. The Fourth Circuit stressed that the most
important factor in the case was whether the plaintiff's trademark and the
defendants' T-shirt design looked alike in the eyes of the ordinary consumer.
When a jury reasonably concludes there is no likelihood of confusion
because of differences between the marks, consideration of the remaining
Pizzeria Uno factors is unnecessary. The Fourth Circuit stated that unless
a threshold of intrinsic similarity is reached, the remaining extrinsic factors
are insufficient by themselves to establish a likelihood of confusion.
Despite the similarities between the plaintiff's trademark and the defen-
dants' T-shirt design, the Fourth Circuit found three conspicuous differences
that provided the jury with a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude
that the T-shirt design would not cause consumer confusion: first, the T-
shirt made no reference to Anheuser-Busch or Budweiser; second, the
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analogous language descriptive of the beach replaced the Budweiser label
descriptions; and third, the shirt design substituted beach slogans for the
Budweiser beer slogans. The Fourth Circuit stated that when no evidence
of actual confusion is present, as in the case at bar, a jury can reasonably
conclude that, despite similarities, no likelihood of confusion exists because
of the differences in the marks. If the jury concludes that because of the
differences between the two marks no likelihood of consumer confusion
exists, consideration of the remaining Pizzeria Uno factors is unnecessary.
Anheuser-Busch argued further that the T-shirt design was not parody
because the defendants' purpose was to draw on the commercial magnetism
of the Budweiser label to make money and not to make a commentary
about Budweiser beer. While conceding that the defendants were motivated
by profit, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the relevant intent in trade-
mark cases is the intent to confuse the ordinary consumer, not the intent
to make a profit. An alleged infringer, in the context of parody, may intend
to benefit from the original trademark without ever intending or causing
consumer confusion. The Fourth Circuit found that the substantial differ-
ences in the trademark and T-shirt provided ample evidentiary support for
the jury's conclusion that the T-shirt design was a commentary on the
pleasures of beach life and that the design did not generate consumer
confusion.
Retired Supreme Court Justice Powell, sitting by designation, dissented.
Contrary to the majority's findings, Justice Powell found evidence of actual
confusion based on the testimony of one of the defendants' purchasers. In
addition, Justice Powell disagreed with the majority that a parody defense
provides an exception to the presumption of likelihood of confusion that
arises when a party intentionally copies or patterns an existing mark. Justice
Powell concluded that parody was simply a merchandising shortcut on the
defendants' part and not a valid defense to the charges brought under the
Lanham Act.
The Fourth Circuit has not yet broached the issue of parody protection
under the First Amendment. In Anheuser-Busch, the Fourth Circuit elected
to reinstate the jury verdict on statutory grounds and declined to address
the defendants' contention that the First Amendment provided an inde-
pendent basis for reinstating the jury's verdict.6 72
672. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 321 n.2 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992).
